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ESSAY
TROUBLE PRESERVING PARADISE?
Nicole Stelle Garnettt

Pa said there were too many people in the Big Woods now. Quite often
Laura heard the ringing thud of an ax which was not Pa's ax, or the echo of
a shot that did not come from his gun. The path that went by the little house
had become a road

...

Wild animals would not stay in a country where

there were so many people. Pa did not like to stay, either.

-Laura

Ingalls Wilder 1

Election Day 2000 was not a good day for proponents of suburban growth controls. 2 They watched in bitter disbelief as the overwhelming initial support for initiatives that proposed statewide growth
management plans in Colorado and Arizona withered in the face of
vigorous opposition campaigns. 3 And, adding insult to injury, they
woke up on Wednesday morning to learn that voters in Oregon had
approved a little-noticed initiative 4 that amended the state constitution to require compensation for "partial" regulatory takings-that is,
for any "reduction in the fair market value" of property resulting from
government regulation 5-thus throwing into question the future of
6
the state's widely touted "model" controlled growth scheme.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. J.D., Yale 1995; B.A., Stanford
1992. I thank Rick Garnett, Bill Kelley, John Nagle, Vincent Rougeau, and Steven Smith
for helpful comments. I am also indebted to research librarian Patti Ogden and to Christopher Keegan for valuable research assistance.
1
LAURA INGALLS WILDER, LITTLE HOUSE ON THE PRAIRIE 1-2 (1935).
2
See EnvironmentalInitiativesDo Poorly on State Ballots, NAT'LJ.'s CONGRESSDAILy (evening ed.), Nov. 8, 2000 (describing defeat of several major land use initiatives), available at
2000 WL 27012646.
3

Carey Goldberg, The Ballot Initiatives: Changes in Drug Policy and Gun Laws Are Picked,

N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2000, at B12 (noting that defeated growth control initiatives received
support from only 30% of voters in both Colorado and Arizona).
4 See Editorial, The Sleeper: It's Measure 7, a Costly, Radical and Deceptive Scheme to Dismantle Oregon'sEnvironmental and Land-Use Legacy, OREGONIAN, Nov. 2, 2000, at D14 (noting
that Measure 7 attracted little pre-election attention).
5 OR. CONST. art. I, § 18(a). The text of Ballot Measure 7 as adopted, which
amended the Oregon Constitution by adding subsections (a) through (f) to section 18 of
Article I, is available at http:/wwv.sos.state.or.us/elections/irr/2000/046text.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2000).
6
SeeJoe Mosley, 'Takings'Law Clouds Land Use Rules, REGISiER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.),
Nov. 9, 2000, at IA; R. Gregory Nokes, Measure 7 Clouds Future of Growth Boundaries,Oiuc oNIAN, Nov. 14, 2000, at BI (reporting that a Department of Land Conservation and Development official commented "[i]f [Measure 7] is retroactive, I think it is the virtual end of
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It was not supposed to be this way. Early in the election cycle,
Vice President Gore promised to make "livability" issues, including
suburban growth controls, a cornerstone of his campaign. 7 This strategy built upon what Gore and others reasonably perceived as a
groundswell of support for limits on new development.8 Public-opinion polls consistently show high levels of support for curbing suburban growth, 9 many Americans list the ills of suburban sprawl as the
most important issue facing their communities. 10 What's more, socalled smart-growth initiatives enjoyed widespread success at the polls
during the 1998 election cycle." Advocates were therefore understandably optimistic about the prospects of initiatives proposing comprehensive growth controls on the ballots in November 2000. The
results in Colorado and Arizona, where unprecedented growth has
driven anti-sprawl sentiments to an all-time high, understandably disappointed them as well. 12 And, the approval of Oregon's partial-takings amendment was downright flabbergasting. 13
At least on the surface, all three of these election results suggest
that voter support for growth controls may be thinner than advocates
had hoped-or at least that it has limits. This Essay uses the November 2000 election results to explore what those limits may be: Why did
voters reject growth controls in Colorado and Arizona, and limit them
in Oregon, despite repeated protestations that they strongly support
urban growth boundaries"). For a description of Oregon's controlled growth scheme, see
infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
7 Terry M. Neal, 'Livability' A NationalIssue? Voters' Urban Woes May Play into Presidential Race, WASH. PosT, Aug. 15, 1999, at A2.
8 See id. ("V]oters around the country have approved nearly 200 initiatives aimed at
controlling or limiting sprawl and preserving open space.").
9

ROPER CTR.FOR PUB. OPINION RESEARCH, WHY VOTERS CARE ABOUT THE QUALITY OF

LIFE (2000) (poll conducted in June 2000 finding that 74% of Americans expressed sup-

port for "growth plans that seek to concentrate development in already developed areas in
order to limit sprawl and preserve open spaces"), available at Westlaw, POLL Database,
Question ID USPENN.OODLCJ R14.
10

See PEW CTR. FOR CIVCJOURNALISM,

RESEARCH-STRAIGHT TALK FROM AMERICANS-

ITS COMMUNITIES (2000), at http://
wvv.pecenter.org/doingcj/research/r_ST2000natl.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (national poll finding that 18% of Americans, and 26% of suburban residents, listed "development/sprawl/traffic/roads" as the most important problem facing their community).
I I PHYLus MYERS, LWVABILITY AT THE BAI.LOT Box: STATE AND LocAL REFERENDA ON
2000:

THE

STATE

OF

THE

NATION

AND

PARKS, CONSERVATION, AND SMARTER GROWTH, ELECTION DAY 1998, at 2 (Ctr. on Urban &

Metro. Policy, Brookings Inst., Discussion Paper, 1999), at http://vw.brook.edu/es/urban/myers.pdf (voters approved over 70% of the 240 growth-related initiatives); Richard
Lacayo, The Brawl over Sprawl TIME, Mar. 22, 1999, at 44, 45 (noting that most of the over
240 "antisprawl" initiatives on the 1998 ballot passed).
12
See PEw CR.FOR CIVIC JOURNALISM, supra note 10 (finding that 60% of Denver
residents listed sprawl as the biggest problem facing their community); Kathleen Ingley,
73% of Arizonans in Poll Support Control of Spraw ARIz. REPUBLiC, May 28, 1999, at Bi.
13

See Randy Gragg, Measure 7 Detonates Land-Use Planning,OREGONIAN, Dec. 3, 2000,

at F3 (describing election as "the day property-rights activists detonated the state's
identity").
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them? What characteristics distinguish smart-growth policies that enjoyed continued success at the polls? And, what does the discrepancy
between successful and unsuccessful policies say about how voters may
react to future efforts to control the suburban sprawl that they supposedly dread?
Before answering these questions, I first set the stage with a
thumbnail sketch of academic arguments for and against suburban
growth controls. I then piece together, through accounts in the press,
the electoral "stories" in Colorado, Arizona, and Oregon. I attempt to
explain the results in these three states, all of which would have surprised poll watchers as late as a few weeks before the election. I also
dissect growth control proponents' explanations for these electoral
disappointments-that powerful special interests, mounting misleading public relations campaigns stole the Colorado and Arizona elections, and that Oregon voters simply failed to understand the
implications of the partial-takings measure.
With this background in mind, I consider the future prospects for
the comprehensive curbs on development preferred by academic proponents of growth controls, such as those at issue in Arizona and Colorado last year. 1 4 Ultimately, the outcome of the growth control
debates in those states demonstrates that those seeking to enact such
policies through statewide initiatives likely will face uphill battles. In
2000, voters proved more willing to endorse growth controls imposed
on a local, as opposed to a regional or statewide basis. And, public
choice theory suggests that the influential interests that opposed the
Arizona and Colorado initiatives may dampen prospects for state legis1
lative action.

5

Furthermore, the election results demonstrate that the public's
anti-sprawl sentiments may be more readily channeled toward policies
that minimize the externalities of sprawl without restricting development on a comprehensive scale, such as the conservation and openspace policies that enjoyed widespread success last November. 16
While these policies may not address all of the woes targeted by comprehensive growth management policies, they do have significant benefits. Given the potential negative consequences imposed by local
controls on new developments, they may prove to be a wiser policy
alternative than other politically feasible options.

14

See, e.g., infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.

16

See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Political-Economy and thw Casefor a Metropolitan

15

See infra notes 149-80 and accompanying text.

Green Space Initiative, 32 URa. LAW. 367, 380-90 (2000) (arguing for such policies).
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I
THE ACADEMIC DEBATE OVER GROWTH CONoLs

The reality of suburban sprawlA 7 forms the backdrop of a vigorous
academic debate about growth controls.' 8 Many academics decry the
predominant American pattern of development' 9 with two prevailing
criticisms: that it contributes both to environmental degradation and
20
intramunicipal economic inequities.
As for the first criticism, there is no question that suburban
sprawl has serious environmental consequences. 2 1 New suburban de22
velopment inevitably consumes agricultural land and green spaces.
As a result, "the aesthetic and environmental benefits of green spaces
are forever lost, as are [their] biodiversity benefits."23 Suburban development also means new roads, parking lots, and other improvements, which increase run-off that degrades water quality.2 4 Lowdensity residential development makes commuting by mass transit a

17 Academics dispute how to define "suburban sprawl." See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON
& VrcKi L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 960 (2d ed. 1999) (noting existence of debate). I
adhere to the following definition, recently set forth by Robert Burchell and Naveed Shad:

Sprawl refers to a particular type of suburban peripheral growth. It
refers to development that expands in an unlimited and noncontiguous (leapfrog) way outward from the solidly built-up core of a metropolitan area. In
terms of land-use type, sprawl includes both residentialand nonresidentialdevelopment. Residential development contains primarily single-family housing, including significant numbers of distant units scattered in outlying
areas. Nonresidential development includes shopping centers, strip retail
outlets along arterial roads, industrial and office parks, and freestanding
industrial and office buildings, as well as schools and other public
buildings.
RobertW. Burchell & NaveedA. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debatein the United States, 5
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 141 (1999).
18 Because this debate spans thirty years, I have truncated my discussion of the rich
literature on growth controls as a matter of necessity. A full explication of the nuances of
the debate is far beyond the scope of this Essay.
19 See, e.g., KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 283-87 (1985) (describing the
process of suburbanization in the U.S.).
20 See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl 29 URB.
LAW. 183, 184 (1997) (characterizing the costs of sprawl).
21 See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexit; 68 FoRDHAM L. REV. 57, 72-75 (1999) (discussing ways in which sprawl contributes
to air pollution and other environment harms).
22 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 17, at 141 ("Another of sprawl's distinguishing
traits is its consumption of exurban agriculturaland otherfrail lands in abundance, since these
are the types of land found at the periphery of development."); Buzbee, supra note 21, at
74; Robert H. Freilich & Linda Kirts Davis, Saving the Land. The Utilization of Modern Techniques of Growth Management to PreserveRural and AgriculturalAmerica, 13 URB. LAw. 27, 30
(noting that "[uirbanization is encroaching on some of the nation's very best cropland").
Buzbee, supra note 21, at 74 (footnote omitted).
23
24

See id.
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near impossibility, 25 forcing suburbanites to drive to work.26 This
commuting pattern causes terrible traffic congestion that eats up
Americans' precious free time, 2 7 increases stress, 28 and, of course, pro29
duces air pollution.
A second critique of suburban sprawl is that it has contributed
mightily to the economic woes plaguing major cities. 30 A decision to
build on the urban periphery represents a decision not to invest in the
urban core. Over time, critics argue, sprawl causes cities to spiral
downward. Disinvestment decreases property values and undercuts
property tax bases, forcing cities to raise taxes to pay for basic city
services. 3 1 As taxes increase and the quality of services decrease, more
residents and businesses flee for the suburbs. With them, these residents and businesses take jobs and cause demand for government
services to rise. 32 The tone of some of this literature is quite inflammatory, blaming suburbanites for contributing to the economic and
racial segregation of American metropolitan areas, 3 3 as well as for
leeching off of cities by taking advantage of the cultural and commer25 See ANTHONY DowNs, NEw VISIONS FOR A METROPOLITAN AMERICA 8-9 (1994) (arguing that sprawl makes public transportation infeasible); Richard Briffault, The Local Govemment Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1135 (1996); Craig N.
Oren, Getting Commuters out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. E
LvrL.
L.J. 141,
169-70 (1998) (same).
26 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 17, at 141 (noting that "[u]nder sprawl conditions,
there is almost total reliance on the automobile"); Oren, supra note 25, at 169-70.
27 See DowNs, supra note 25, at 8 (noting increased commute times). Economist Paul
Krugman has noted that in 1995 "Americans lost more than eight billion hours to traffic
delays, at a total cost of more than $80 billion-mainly in the form of wasted time." Paul
R. Krugman, The Tax-Reform Obsession, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 37.
28 See generally Daniel Stokols et al., Traffic Congestion, Type A Behaviorand Stress, 63 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 467 (1978) (reporting results of a behavioral study linking stress to traffic
congestion).
29 Buzbee, supra note 21, at 73 (noting that traffic congestion is the major culprit
when cities fail to attain Clean Air Act ozone standards); see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A
Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worhed; What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 E'wvrL.
L. 1549, 1572 (1991) (arguing that sprawl causes residents to depend upon automobiles
and results in air pollution).
30 See Buzbee, supra note 21, at 69-70 (discussing harmful economic effects including
disinvestment, deteriorating housing, and decreased tax base). For a detailed discussion of
sprawl's sociological costs (and benefits), see DowNs, supra note 25, at 60-94.
31 Robert W. Burchell, Economic and Fiscal Costs (and Benefits) of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAw.
159, 167-68 (1997); Buzbee, supra note 21, at 69-70; see also ARTHUR C. NELSON &JAMEs B.
DUNCAN, GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRAcrIcEs 4-7 (1995) (reviewing evidence
of the negative economic impact of suburban sprawl); Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 11 (2000) (arguing that sprawl contributes to the downward
spiral of urban core areas).
32 Buzbee, supra note 21, at 69-70; see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 2), 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 351 (1990) (noting that big cities frequently have "serious social welfare and infrastructure problems, straitened economies and traditionally high tax rates").
33 See, e.g., Burchell, supra note 31, at 168; Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 20, at 189-90;
Jerry Frug, DecenteringDecentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 281 (1993).
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cial benefits that major cities provide without paying their fair share of
34
the costs of these amenities.
According to growth control proponents, properly structured,
metropolitan- or statewide limits on suburban development are necessary to address sprawl's twin ills,3 5 because local government power
leads to a tragedy of the commons within a metropolitan area.36 Suburban governments, viewed as co-equal in the eyes of the law, 37 jealously guard their authority to regulate land use to maximize local tax
revenues and resident satisfaction.3 8 More affluent "inner-ring" suburbs accomplish these goals through exclusionary zoning techniques
39
that freeze out new development, pushing it to the suburban fringe.
Consequently, communities located on that fringe enjoy a competitive
advantage and have incentives to encourage development by relaxing
land use standards. 40 Sprawl results inevitably from this pattern of exclusion and invitation. 4 1 Proponents argue that growth controls can
counter this pattern by channeling development back into declining
central cities and saving undeveloped land.42
Other academics, however, assert that growth controls have severe adverse consequences. Most anti-growth policies are imposed lo34
Briffault, supra note 25, at 1139; see also Briffault, supra note 32, at 443 (commenting that suburbanites now routinely deny the "historic association of suburbs with their
cities," including the fact that "the city was the primary center ofjobs and commercial and
cultural institutions for the region"); Frug, supranote 33, at 279 (arguing that local government laws should force suburbanites to recognize that localities are situated within a
region).
35 Comprehensive growth management is not the only policy tool proposed to address sprawl. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 16, at 378-79 (summarizing components of the
standard "sprawl policy menu," including reorienting transportation policy away from
highways and toward public transportation, relaxing so-called "Euclidean" zoning rules,
requiring environmental impact statements for new development, and a host of urban revitalization efforts).
36
See NELSON & DUNCAN, supranote 31, at 19 ("Regional approaches to planning and
growth management issues have long been championed as a necessary alternative to the
problems associated with fragmented, uncoordinated, and competitive local government
policies."); Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 20, at 197 ("If communities refrain from adopting aggressive, coordinated growth management strategies, development will continue to
sprawl across the countryside, because sprawl is a process that pits new development areas
against old.").
37 See Briffault, supra note 32, at 349 (noting that "local government law does not
distinguish within the category of municipal corporation between city and suburb").
38 See Briffault, supra note 25, at 1134-35; Briffault, supra note 32, at 366 (linking
suburban autonomy and local land use regulation).
39 Briffiult, supra note 25, at 1136;Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L.
Rxv. 1047, 1083-84 (1996).
40
See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Do GRoWNT CONTROLS MATTER? 53-57 (1990); Briffault,
supra note 25, at 1136-37.
41
See Freilich & Davis, supra note 22, at 30-31.
42
See id.at 29. See generallyWilliam B. Shore, Recentralization: The Single Answer to More
Than a Dozen United States Problems and a Major Answer to Poverty, 61J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 496
(1995) (advocating for the "recentralization" of urban areas to combat downward economic trends).
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cally, not regionally (a reality running contrary to the hopes of
academic growth management proponents). These critics claim that
growth controls exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, sprawl by shifting
development to noncontrolled areas. 43 As William Fischel has observed, growth controls "probably cause metropolitan areas to be too
spread out. [L] ocal ordinances cause developers to go to other communities. The most likely alternative sites are in exurban and rural
communities, where the political climate, at least initially, is more
favorable to development. "44
There is some empirical evidence to support this proposition.
For example, one well-known study of the San Francisco Bay Area
found that development disproportionately concentrated in municipalities without growth controls. 45 Growth controls-at least in their
most common forms4 6-contributed to the very pattern of develop47
ment that growth management proponents deplore.
Moreover, growth controls, according to their critics, do not necessarily lead to a more equitable distribution of economic resources
within metropolitan areas. Both economic theory and empirical research suggest that limits on development drive up property values
and therefore deprive low-income individuals of affordable housing
opportunities. 48 Development limits also force neighboring communities to accept less desirable land uses. 49 Not surprisingly, support
for growth controls tends to be highest in areas with high housing
ownership rates. As Professor Ellickson has observed, "[a]ntigrowth
measures have one premier class of beneficiaries: those who already
own residential structures in the municipality doing the excluding." 50
Importantly, experience in Oregon and elsewhere suggests that these
43
See, e.g., Q. Shen, SpatialImpacts of Locally Enacted Growth Controls: The San Francisco
Bay Region in the 1980s, 23 ENV'T & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 61, 86 (1996).
44 FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 55.
45
See Shen, supra note 43, at 86.
46
See FiSCHEL, supra note 40, at 2-3.
47
See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
48
See Shen, supra note 43; see also FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 29-41.
49 Jan K Brueckner, Growth Controls and Land Values in an Open Cio, 66 LAND ECON.

237, 240-41 (1990); Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Strategic Growth Controls, 25
REGIONAL SCI. & URB.ECON. 435, 438 (1995); Susan M. Wachter & Man Cho, Interjurisdictional PriceEffects of Land Use Controls, 40 WASH. U. J. U"a. & CONTEMP. L. 49, 50 (1991).
50
Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE LJ. 385, 400 (1977). Although the evidence is mixed, some studies show a correla-

tion between levels of home ownership and support for growth controls. See, e.g., MAmx
BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICA

95 (1986)

(finding strong correlation between home ownership and support for limiting apartment
construction); Alan Gin &Jonathan Sandy, Evaluatingthe Demandfor Residential Growth Controls, 3 J. HOUsING ECON. 109, 119 (1994) (concluding that support for growth controls

increases with rates of home ownership). But see Mark Baldassare & Georjeanna Wilson,
Changing Sources of Suburban Support for Local Growth Controls, 33 URB.

(1996) (finding mixed evidence on correlation).

STUD.

459, 466-67
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price effects hold true regardless of whether the controls operate on a
local or a multijurisdictional basis.51
II
THE PoL-rIcAr, DEBATE, CiRcA 2000
At the outset, it hardly comes as a surprise that Colorado and
Arizona proved to be the major battlegrounds for growth controls
during the last election cycle. Both states have experienced exponential growth in recent years, after recovering from devastating recessions ten years ago. Both states are also blessed with striking natural
beauty which is increasingly marred by new suburban tract homes and
"McMansions." Residents of both Colorado and Arizona regularly cite
sprawl as one of the most important-if not the most important-issues facing their states.52 Given these similarities, the fact that the two
debates over similar growth control proposals ran nearly parallel to
each other was not entirely unpredictable. In both states, strong initial support for the proposals rapidly eroded in the face of well-funded
53
campaigns conducted by similarly constituted opposition coalitions.
A.

Colorado's Amendment 24

A group of environmentalists unveiled the Colorado Responsible
Growth Initiative, or Amendment 24, in March 2000. 54 Amendment
24 would have amended the Colorado Constitution to require local
55
governments to designate growth areas for all new development.
The growth areas, and any amendments to them, were to become ef51 See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Ingley, supra note 12 (showing 73% of voters supported giving local governments the power to set growth boundaries); M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Down on Development:
Growth, Sprawl, Roads Listed as Top Problems by Six of 10 Residents in Latest Metro Study, DENVER
RocKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Feb. 13, 2000, at 5A (discussing poll results in Denver area).
53 See Environmental InitiativesDo Poorly on State Ballots, supra note 2 (noting that antisprawl measures in Colorado and Arizona lost by 70/30 margins "[diespite commanding
late summer leads"); Louis Jacobson, Business Leading on Arizona, Colorado Sprawl Issues,
NAT'LJ.'s CONGREssDAiLY (evening ed.), Nov. 3, 2000 (noting that support for Arizona

Proposition 202 had fallen from sixty-eight percent of voters in July 2000 to twenty-four
percent in October 2000; support for Colorado Amendment 24 had plummeted from a
high of sixty-five percent to thirty-two percent during the same time period), available at
2000 WL 27012806; Home BuildersApplaud Voter Rejection of Anti-Growth Initiatives in Arizona,
Colorado, U.S. NEwswiRE, Nov. 8, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, U.S. Newswire File [hereinafter Home Builders] (describing the interests opposing growth controls as "similar").
54 Sue O'Brien, Editorial, When LeadersDon't Lead, the PeopleDo, DENVER POST, Mar. 26,
2000, at 14; John Sanko, EnvironmentalistsPush Anti-Sprawl Proposal DENVER RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWs, Apr. 24, 2000, at 10A.
55

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2000 STATE-

WIDE BALLOT PROPOSALS, Amend. 24 §§ 4(4), (6), at 54, 56 (Nov. 7, 2000), available at

http://vv.state.co/us/gov-dir/leg-dir/csstaff/2000/ballot/Bluebook/HTML/
2000bluebook.htm.
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fective only upon approval by local voters.5 6 Sponsors of the initiative
claimed that the failure of the state legislature to enact growth control
legislation necessitated the plebiscite. 57 Initial voter response to the
proposal echoed this frustration; early reaction to Amendment 24 was
overwhelmingly positive, with polls reflecting a seventy-eight percent
58
favorable rating in June 2000.
Opponents wasted little time before striking back with a vengeance, organizing over 160 organizations to campaign against the
measure. 59 Membership in the impressively diverse "No on 24" coalition ranged from development and real estate interests, 60 to unions, 6 1
local governments, 62 and Habitat for Humanity affiliates in Colorado 63-who took a position on a political issue for the first time in
twenty-one years. 64 Elected officials, including Denver's Democratic
Mayor Wellington Webb 65 and Republican Governor Bill Owen, also
opposed the proposal. 66 Opponents amassed an enormous war chest
67
of nearly six million dollars to defeat the measure.
Ultimately, their money proved well spent: A deluge of commercials confronted voters, warning them that Amendment 24 was com-

56

Id. §§ 5, 8, at 55, 57.
See Fred Brown, Growth ChallengeDifficult to Contain, DENVER POST, May 7, 2000, at
IA (petition organizers prompted by legislative failure);Julia C. Martinez, Sprawl Opponents
Launch Petitions, Lambaste Legislators,DENVER POST, May 25, 2000 (same).
58
John Sanko, Tax-Cut, Sprawl ProposalsLose Steam; Both Ballot Measures Still Lead in
ColoradoPoll, but Both Have Lost Significant GroundSince EarlyJune, DENVER RocKY MOUNTAIN
NEWs, Sept. 11, 2000, at 4A (poll showed support for Amendment 24 had fallen from seventy-eight percent in June to sixty-five percent in mid-September).
59 See Editorial, Message from the Voters, DENVER PosT, Nov. 8, 2000, at 10B.
60
See id. The Colorado Association of Realtors required each member to pay a
mandatory fee to oppose the initiative. Todd Hartman, Realtors Group Imposes Fee to Fight
Growth Issue, DENVER RocKy MOUNTAIN NEws, July 22, 2000, at 5A.
61
See Berny Morson, AFL-CIO Officials Oppose Ballot Initiativeto Control Growth, DENVER
ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 6, 2000, at 18A.
62
See Editorial, supra note 59, at 10B.
63
See Vincent Carroll, Squeezing Out Low-Cost Homes, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
57

Sept. 3, 2000, at IB; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Efforts to Restrict Sprawl Find New Resistancefrom
Advocates for Affordable Housing,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at A18.
64
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., State Proposals Will Decide the Pace of Construction, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2000, at A18.
65
See Dan Luzadder, Webb Opposes Amendment 24, DENVER ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Oct. 19, 2000, at 25A.
66
SeeJulia C. Martinez, GovernorHits Growth Initiative,DENVER POST, Sept. 13, 2000, at
B5.
67
See Michelle Ames, Money Talked in Colorado Election, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEws, Nov. 10, 2000, at 6A (noting that the campaign by Coloradans for Responsible Reform was the most expensive initiative campaign in Colorado history, raising $5.7 million
to fight Amendment 24).
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plicated and "extreme," 68 and would devastate the economy.69 These
commercials also asserted that Amendment 24 would make
"[h] ousing so expensive [that] teachers, firefighters and the rest of us
won't be able to live in the communities where we work. ' 70 Proponents countered the onslaught with appeals to the voters' avowed concern about sprawl. 71 They aired commercials featuring smokespewing bulldozers, traffic jams, and smog-shrouded mountains covered with tract houses.72 The ads warned that Amendment 24 was
necessary because "[elvery hour Colorado loses 10 acres of ranchland
73
and open space to sprawling development."
In the end, voters overwhelmingly responded to the opponents'
message. By the fall, previously sky-high support for Amendment 24
had faltered. On election day, only thirty percent of voters cast affirmative votes. 74
B.

Arizona's Proposition 202

Arizona Proposition 202 suffered a similar plight. Although Proposition 202 would have amended the state law (rather than the constitution), it mirrored Amendment 24 in other relevant respects. It
required local governments to establish growth management plans
concentrating all new development within urban growth areas and
prohibiting new development outside of them.7 5 As in Colorado, the
proposed legislation required voter approval of all growth manage76
ment plans and any amendments to them.
68
See Michele Ames & Todd Hartman, Growth Control Amendment Fails: $6 Million Ad
Campaign Helps Defeat Initiative, but Supporters Vow to Press On, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN

NEvs, Nov. 8, 2000, at 24A_

69

See Charles Roos, Editorial, Truth Being Swallowed Up in PoliticalAdvertising,DENVER

ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Oct. 30, 2000, at 33A.
70

Mark Obmascik, Accuracy Isn't the Hallmark of Two Sides' Amend. 24 Ads,

DENVER

POST, Oct. 17, 2000, at A12.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See Karen Abbott, Growth-ControlAds Tap into Emotions: Amendment 24 Motivates Supporters, Detractors to Evoke State's Beauty, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 27, 2000, at
32A
73
See Obmascik, supra note 70.
74
SeeJoanne Ditmer, 24's Defeat Shows Power of Advertising, DENVER POST, Nov. 19,
2000, at 2K.
75 Arizona Proposition 202 would have required the establishment of urban growth
areas "outside of which new urban development and services will be limited." SEC'Y OF
STATE, STATE OF ARIZ., 2000 BALLOT PROPosrrIONs &JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, Prop.
202 § 11-1602(A) (1), at 109 (Nov. 7, 2000), available at http://www.sosaz.com/election/
2000/info/pubparnphlet/english/prop22.pdf. But for a few exceptions, see id. § 11-1605,
at 110, Proposition 202 would also have required developers to pay the full cost of all new
public facilities necessitated by their projects unless the development fell within an "infill
incentive area," id. § 11-1602(A) (2), at 109.
76
Id. § 11-1606, at 110-11 (requiring public hearing and vote on all growth management plans and amendments thereto).
71
72
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As in Colorado, proponents turned to the initiative process in
part out of frustration over legislative inaction with respect to the pace
of new development. 77 And Arizona's growth control proposal, like
Colorado's, enjoyed immense support in the months after proponents
unveiled it, but public sentiment flip-flopped by election day following
a heated opposition campaign. 78 The battle lines over the Arizona
proposal fell along nearly identical lines as well. Environmentalists
campaigned for the measure, 79 and interests similar to the membership of Colorado's "No on 24" campaign comprised the opposition
coalition.8 0 Many elected officials, including the popular governor
Jane Hull, also opposed the proposal. 8 ' Opponents spent millions of
dollars on advertisements warning voters that the measure threatened
83
the state's booming economy8 2 and would drive up housing prices.

On election day, the measure suffered a similarly resounding defeat,
84
losing by a forty-percent margin.

77 See, e.g., Arizona: Growth Initiative Unveiled, GREENWIRE, Mar. 15, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Greenwire File (discussing environmentalist objection to legislative activity); Steve
Wilson, Goal Line So Closefor Agreement on Growth Plan, AMz. REPUBLIC, Feb. 3, 2000, at A2
(discussing breakdown of negotiations between Arizona Governor Jane Hull and Sierra
Club on a compromise growth control initiative).
78 See, e.g., Kathleen Ingley, Voters Do Rip-Flop on Key Measures:Polls Says Yes on Stadium,
No on Growth Limits, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 2000, at Al (noting that barrage of advertising
contributed to drop in support for Proposition 202, from sixty-two percent support in midSeptember to fifty-one percent opposition before election).
79 See Meghan Stromberg, Anti-Growth Initiatives Sound Death Knell for Builders, PROF.
BUILDER, OcL 2000, at 26.
80 Home Builders, supra note 53 ("In Arizona, for example, the AFL-CIO came out
against Proposition 202, as did advocates for the homeless and low-income families. The
state's farmers were also against it, as was the Arizona League of Cities and Towns ....
Similar interests were united against Amendment 24 in Colorado[.]"); see supra notes
59-66 and accompanying text.
81 Pat Flannery, 1 Growth Initiative is Losing Support; Prop. 202 FadingAfter Foes'Ad Blitz,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 2000, at A19 (discussing Hull's growth control proposals);
Stromberg, supra note 79, at 26.
82 For example, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce released a study saying that the
initiative would decrease employment by seven percent and destroy two-thirds of all construction jobs. See Robert Robb, Plausibilityis Question in Prop. 202 Predictions,A~iz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 2000, at B9. See also, e.g., Steve Wilson, In Debate over Growth, Proceed with
Caution, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 22, 2000, at A2 (discussing the argument that "[p]assing the
Citizen's Growth Management Initiative would have the economic impact of dropping a
neutron bomb on Arizona").
83 See, e.g., Oppel, supra note 63.
84

See ARIz. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA OFFIctAL CANvAss: 2000 GENERAL ELEC-

TION-NOvEMBER 7, 2000, at 16, at http://www.sosaz.com/election/2000/BM202.pdf (list-

ing official election results).

2001]
C.

TROUBLE PRESERVING PARADISE?
Oregon's Ballot Measure 7

Oregon has long been a Mecca for proponents of comprehensive
growth management.8 5 In 1973, the state legislature enacted a law
requiring all local governments to adopt and maintain development
plans that parallel academic proponents' "ideal" growth control
86
scheme. Each plan must be consistent with state planning goals,
which include the establishment of "urban growth boundaries" to
"provide for an orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban
land use."87 With few exceptions, all new development must be within
these growth boundaries, as would have been the case under Colorado's Amendment 24 and Arizona's Proposition 202.88 Commentators have hotly contested the wisdom of this policy.89 Boosters of the
Oregon program claim that it has saved the state from sprawl. 90 Critics, however, claim that the growth boundaries have increased property values, and, importantly, housing prices within the growth
boundaries and artificially depressed those outside of them. 9 1
Proponents clearly designed Ballot Measure 7 to appeal to property owners harmed economically by, or at least disillusioned with, the
urban-growth boundary policy.9 2 It provides, in relevant part:
[i]f the [government] passes or enforces a regulation that restricts
the use of private real property, and the restriction has the effect of
reducing the value of property upon which the restriction is im85

See Edward J. Sullivan, Oregon Blazes a Trai, in STATE & REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE
51 (Peter A. Buchsbaum & LarryJ. Smith eds., 1993).
Introduction to PLANNING THE OREGON WAY-. A T-wEr'Y-YEAR EVALUATION, at ix, ix

PLANNING

86

(Carl Abbott et al. eds., 1994).
87 Oregon's Statewide Planning Goals, in PLANNING THE OREGON WAY- A TWENTrv-YEAR
EVALUATION, supra note 86, at 299, 302.
88 See GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED LANDSCAPE: LESSONS ON

39-42 (1992); Arthur C. Nelson, Oregon's Urban
Growth Bounday Policy as a Landmark Planning Tool, in PLANNING THE OREGON WAY A
TWENT
m-YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 86, at 25, 25-45 (explaining Oregon's growth
STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON

boundary policy).
89 See, e.g., ELLICFSON & BEEN, supra note 17, at 993-95 (reviewing literature).
90 See Carl Abbott, The PortlandRegion: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other-and
Often Agree, 8 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 11 (1997). But cf. Henry R. Richmond, Comment on
CarlAbbott's "The PortlandRegion: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other-and Often Agree",
8 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 53, 64 (1997) (advocating for a land use policy reform emphasizing development).
91
See, e.g., KNAAP & NELSON, supra note 88, at 52-58, 82-84 (discussing the debate);
Jim Robbins, Oregon: Two Sides of the Antisprawl Line, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 22, 2001, at 41.
92 See Scott Learn, Rural-InspiredBill CouldAffect Portland,OREGONIAN, Nov. 3, 2000 at
B2 (noting that "rural uproar" over regulations restricting building in farm areas "helped
spur the initiative"); Patty Wentz, This Land is Their Land,WILAiETE WE. (Or.), Nov. 29,
2000 at 21 (interview with Measure 7 sponsors asserting that the initiative was made necessary by government regulations preventing development of farm land).
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posed, the property owner shall be paid just compensation equal to
93
the reduction in the fair market value of the property.
By approving this amendment to the state constitution, Oregon once
again effected a revolution in land use law. The Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause entitles property owners to compensation for "regulatory takings." The compensation requirement under the Fifth
Amendment, however, is not triggered by a partial reduction in value
of the property, but rather by its evisceration. 94 Oregon's ballot measure entitles the property owner to compensation for any reduction in
the value of his or her property.
Despite Measure 7's radical implications-the official fiscal impact statement estimated that the proposal will cost state and local
governments $5.4 billion per year 95-it garnered little pre-election attention. In the months leading up to the election, a few influential
newspapers editorialized against the property rights measure. 96 Measure 7's opponents also overshadowed its boosters in fundraising efforts and in the official voter pamphlet explaining arguments for and
against ballot measures. 9 7 The bulk of the pre-election controversy,
however, centered on several other initiatives sponsored by conservative activist Bill Sizemore, 98 which would have ended the seniority system for public school teacher pay and employment, 99 adopted a
"paycheck-protection" system for union employees, 10 0 required a vote
on all tax and fee increases, 0 1 and made federal income taxes fully
10 2
deductible on state returns.

93 OR. CONST. art. I, § 18(a), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/irr/
2000/046text.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2000).
94 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992).
95

See ELECTIONS Div., OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, ONLINE VOTER's GUIDE: STATE OF OREGON

GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 7, 2000), at http://ivww.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/
guide/mea/m7/m7.htm. See also R. Gregory Nokes, Study Sees Billions in Boundary Costs if
Measure Passes, OREGONIAN, Oct. 17, 2000, at Al (discussing voter pamphlet estimate and
study estimating even higher costs).
96 See, e.g., Editorial, Vote No on Measure 7, OREGONIAN, Oct. 9, 2000, at B8.
97 See David Steves, Opponents of Tax Cuts PullIn Most Donations, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Oct 10, 2000, at Al (noting that while proponents had only $50,000 for the fall
campaigns in support of Measure 7 and five other initiatives, Measure 7's opponents had
raised $650,117); ELECTIONS DIv., supra note 95.
98 See Wentz, supra note 92, at 22; see also Steve Duin, Bill Sizemore: Think Small If You
Think at Al1 OREGONIAN, Oct. 22, 2000, at C1 (commenting on Sizemore's domination of
public debate).
99 See Steves, supra note 97.
100 Steve Mayes, Ripple Effects Add Third Front to Ballot Battle, OREGONIAN, Oct. 30, 2000,
at A6.
101 Editorial, A Word in Oregon's Defense: No, OREGONIAN, Nov. 8, 2000, at C16.
102 Id.
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Measure 7 did not come into the spotlight until polls began to
show high levels of support in early November. 103 At that point, opponents enlisted all the allies they could find, including most of the
10 4
state's political leaders and opinion makers, to defeat the measure.
Ultimately, the dire warnings that Measure 7 would devastate the state
economically and undermine its unique legacy by obliterating the
long-standing land use regime proved ineffectual. 10 5 Measure 7
passed by a slim margin, 0 6 leaving regulators and local governments
scrambling to find a way to comply with its strictures, 10 7 or to have it
declared a nullity post hoc by a court.'0 8

ELECTION

III
2000: EXPLANATIONS AND QUESTIONS

Do the election results in Colorado, Arizona, and Oregon suggest
that the popular tide is turning against growth controls? Proponents
say no, and their explanations for the disappointing results are plausible. Proponents assert that the defeat of Colorado's Amendment 24
and Arizona's Proposition 202 resulted from raw interest-group politics. Opponents of the measures outspent their adversaries by millions
of dollars, 0 9 leaving boosters helpless to counter a deluge of "misleading" advertisements." 0 As Elise Jones, a spokeswoman for the spon103

See Diane Dietz, Myriad Measures Stir Feelings, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Nov.

3, 2000, at IA (noting that Measure 7 "hardly registered a flicker on the political passions
meter through the fall campaign"); Ed Russo, Voters Take Stock of Measure 7, REGISTERGUARD (Eugene, Or.), Nov. 3, 2000 (indicating that a late-October poll showed forty-nine
percent of likely voters supported measure).
104
See R. Gregory Nokes, Opponents CallMeasure 7 Threat to Land,McCall Legacy, OREGoNIAN, Nov. 2, 2000, at All (discussing Oregon GovernorJohn Kitzhaber's vociferous opposition); Editorial, supra note 4.
105
See, e.g., Cristine Gonzalez, Measure 7 Draws Late Opposition:Passage Would Be Economic Bombshell, Opponents Say, E. OREGONAN, Nov. 7, 2000, at http://www.eonow.com/
news/stories/2000/nov/07b.shtml.
106 Unofficial results on Measure 7, listed by county, can be found at http://
wvv.orcities.org/members/M7/m7ns022.pdf.
107 See, e.g., Don Hamilton, Cities, County Sketch Measure 7 Reply, OREGONAN, Dec. 6,
2000, at El (local governments instituting claims procedures); Nokes, supra note 6.
108 Activists and local governments immediately filed a lawsuit challenging the amendment under several theories. SeeScott Learn, Cities GoingAfter Measure 7, OREGONAN, Nov.
30, 2000, at Cl. In February 2000, a trial judge invalidated the measure on state constitutional grounds. See McCall v. Kitzhaber, No. 00C19871 (Or. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2000).
109 See Ames, supra note 67 (reporting that Coloradans for Responsible Growth spent
$934,216 and Coloradans for Responsible Reform spent $5,717,439).
110 See Abbott, supra note 72 (quoting pro-amendment campaign chairwoman criticizing one ad as "totally false, totally deceiving"); Ditner, supranote 74 (editorial characterizing the "No on 24" advertisements as "inaccurate scare-tactic charges against the
amendment"); Obmascik, supra note 70 ("Amendment 24 may be aimed at controlling
Colorado's rapid growth, but it's not stopping the sprawl of misleading TV ads."); Roos,
supra note 69 (discussing "television advertising that is oversimplified, inflammatory and
even downright false"); see also E.J. Montini, Resisting Indecent Propositions,ARiz. REPUBLIC,
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sors of Amendment 24, explained, "'The outcome of this election is
the result of nearly $6 million barrage of misleading ads .... It's extremely difficult if not impossible to overcome 1that
amount of money
11
and that amount of misleading information."'
This explanation fits neatly within the substantial body of academic literature on initiatives. Contrary to the hopes of Progressiveera reformers, 112 well-funded and well-organized special interests tend
to dominate the initiative process. 1 3 This is in part because the high
costs of participation dissuade unorganized citizens from getting involved." 4 Indeed, the results in Colorado and Arizona follow the pattern identified by empirical studies of initiatives. Not only is there a
strong correlation between the amount of money spent on an initiative campaign and the election outcome," 5 but disproportionate
spending is most effective when used to oppose an initiative, rather
than to support it.116 David Magleby's comprehensive study of initia-

tives found that even initiatives with substantial early support usually
fail when, as in Colorado and Arizona, opponents launch a well-organized and well-funded "no" campaign to convince voters to reconsider
the wisdom of their initial inclinations." 7 As for the veracity of the
Nov. 2, 2000, at B1 (discussing anti-initiative ad campaigns in Arizona); Jim Nintzel, The
Lying Game, TUCSON WEEKLY, Oct. 12, 2000, at 18 (same).
111 Ames & Hartman, supra note 68 (quoting Elise Jones).
112

See generally DAVID D.

SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLU-

3-23 (1989) (reviewing history of initiative movement during Progressive era); Julian
N. Eule, JudicialReview of DirectDemocracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1512 & n.37 (1990) (reviewing
literature on popular referenda and initiatives); Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1348 (1985) (reviewing DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTTION

INGS ON BALLOT PREPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1984)) (noting that Progressive-era

legislators created the initiative to address the concern that special interests had captured
the legislative process, believing that direct democracy would "break the stranglehold these
[special interests] had on the political process").
113 See Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites,Participation,and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 936 (1988); see also MAGLEBY, supranote 112, at 6 (arguing
that initiatives involve well-funded campaigns because of interest group participation).
114 See MAGLEBY, supra note 112, at 36-42 (discussing state ballot qualification requirements that lead to reliance on the "initiative industry"); Elizabeth Garrett, VWho DirectsDirect
Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 19-22 (1997) (discussing significant organization impediments to ballot qualification).
115
See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 544-46 (1982)
(discussing a correlation between one-sided spending and a successful outcome).
116 Lynn A. Baker, ConstitutionalChange and Direct Democracy, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 143,
147-48 (1995) (reviewing literature demonstrating that "[o]ne-sided spending has been
successful in persuading people to vote againstan initiative, but has had a negligible effect
on obtaining affirmative votes"); see also MAGLEBY, supra note 112, at 167 (noting that high
levels of negative campaign spending can spell defeat for an initiative).
117
See MAGLEBY, supra note 112, at 211-14. This phenomenon may be partially attributable to the fact that voters without strong preferences (who come to the ballot box to vote
in candidate elections) decide the outcome of initiative elections. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker,
DirectDemocracy and Discrimination:A Public Choice Perspective,67 CHi.-KExr L. REV. 707, 724
(1991) (arguing that "individuals may well vote in plebiscites even if they have little interest
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advertisements opposing the Colorado and Arizona initiatives, academic opponents of initiatives regularly complain that misleading or
oversimplified "sloganeering" typically characterizes campaign
advertising.118
Of course, these factors cannot explain results in Oregon, where
Ballot Measure 7's success challenges the conventional academic wisdom that monied special interests dominate initiative battles. Measure 7's champions were "a pair of down-home property-rights
zealots" 119 who were vastly outspent by respected, establishment interests. The measure also went virtually unnoticed before its
120
enactment.
To explain the unexpected success of Oregon's partial-takings
proposal, opponents must fall back on another familiar academic refrain about the initiative process: that voters often have absolutely no
idea what they are doing when they vote on initiatives. 12 1 Not only is
the initiative process, according to its critics, inherently undeliberative, 122 but ballot initiatives frequently are written in legal language
that is impenetrable to the lay person. 123 Voter uncertainty and confusion is particularly problematic when, as with Measure 7, the initiative generates little pre-election publicity. This forces voters to make
their decisions in "an informational vacuum." 24 The post-election debate swirling around Measure 7 illustrates this point. Even welltrained land use attorneys dispute how it will affect land use regulation in Oregon. 125 And, a trial court enjoined the implementation of
in outcome"). Such voters may be relatively amenable to changing their initial inclinations
about an initiative.
118 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 112, at 1355. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 115,
at 609-31 (discussing California initiatives and campaigns between 1968 and 1980).

See Wentz, supra note 92, at 22 (characterizing the authors of Measure 7).
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 112, at 118-19 (presenting a table of the readability of
referenda in four states and discussing their difficulty level).
122 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrierto RacialEquality, 54
WASH. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1978) (arguing that the "emotionally charged atmosphere often
surrounding referenda and initiatives can easily reduce the care with which the voters consider the matters submitted to them"); Gillette, supra note 113, at 942-44 (discussing the
argument that initiative process is flawed, compared to legislative process, because legislators are more deliberative). But see Baker, supra note 117, at 737-51 (contesting the
argument).
123
See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECr DEMOCRACY. THE POLITICS OF INITIATWE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 75 (1989) (arguing that technical difficulty of ballot language may actually disenfranchise some voters); MAGLEBY, supra note 112, at 118-19 (finding that ballot
measures in Oregon required the average voter to have a reading level equivalent to that of
a person with bachelors degree plus two years of graduate training to understand them);
see also Eule, supra note 112, at 1516-17 (reviewing public opinion data indicating that
voters frequently do not understand initiatives).
124
MAGLEBY, supra note 112, at 167.
125 See Op. Or. Att'y Gen. No. 8277 (Feb. 13, 2001) (responding to Oregon Governor
John Kitzhaber's request for clarification on Measure 7's effects), available at http://
119
120
121
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Measure 7, after finding a reasonable likelihood that the text of the
provision failed to "give voters fair notice of all of the legal changes
which would follow from the enactment of the proposed
26
amendment."1
While plausible, none of these explanations eliminate the lingering sense that the ballot initiative results in Colorado, Arizona, and
Oregon resulted from something more than a toxic combination of
special interest politics and voter ignorance. The "NO" campaigns in
Colorado and Arizona may have been hyperbolic and even misleading, but they presented voters with a stark choice between controlling
growth and preserving affordable housing. This dichotomy swayed
voters twice, in separate states, in the same election cycle, suggesting
that similar arguments could convince voters in future battles.
Finally, voter confusion alone cannot explain results in Oregon.
Voters usually respond to uncertainty about an initiative's meaning
27
conservatively, by voting no and maintaining the status quo ante.'
Presumably, the overwhelmingly negative attention that Measure 7 received at the eleventh hour should have reinforced voters' conservative instincts. 128 Yet, while voters rejected most of Oregon's statewide
initiatives, including those that received the lion's share of pre-election publicity,129 voters embraced Measure 7, thereby upsetting Oregon's long-standing land use regime. Furthermore, the geographic
distribution of support for Measure 7 suggests that part of the motivation for this unorthodox response may have been a backlash against
the existing land use regulations. Voter approval was highest (over
seventy percent) in areas outside of urban-growth boundaries, where
130
the system artificially deflates property values.
wvw.doj.state.or.us/AGOffice/agopinions/op8277.pdf, see also, e.g., Brent Hunsberger, Effects of Measure 7Remain UpforDebate,OREGONIAN, Nov. 20, 2000, atAl; Nokes, supra note 6.
For a discussion of the problems that courts face when interpreting initiative language, see
Philip P. Frickey, Interpretationon the Borderline: Constitution, Canons,Direct Democracy, 1996
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477 (1996); John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted
Statutes, 1996 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 535 (1996);Jane S. Schacter, ThePursuit of "PopularIntent":
InterpretiveDilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
126 McCall v. Kitzhaber, No. 00C19871 (Or. Cir. Ct., Dec. 6, 2000), available at http://
ivw.orcities.org/members/M7/m7page.html (enjoining enforcement of Measure 7 and
finding that the language failed to inform voters of the full impact of the proposal).
127 Briffault, supra note 112, at 1356-57.
128 The fact that all Oregon residents vote by mail, see OR. SEC'Y oF STATE, VOT-BYMAIL: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.sos.state.or.us/executive/policy-initiatives/vbm/faq.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2001), makes evaluating the extent to which these
efforts influenced the election's outcome particularly problematic.
129 Harry Esteve, Oregon Voters Tame Tidal Wave of Ballot Measures, OREGONIAN, Nov. 9,
2000, at C9; The Measures, OREGONIAN, Nov. 8, 2000, at C4 (listing results on state-wide
ballot measures); see also BALLOTMEASURE.COM, available at http://ballotmeasure.com/BallotMeasures.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2001) (listing results on state-wide ballot measures).
130 See Wentz, supra note 92, at 21 (initiative passed fifty-three to forty-seven percent,
but up support soared as high as sixty-nine percent in rural counties).

2001]

TROUBLE PRESERVING PARADISE?

Growth control advocates have bolstered their positive read on
last November's election results with assertions that, nationwide, voters considered and approved a record number of smart-growth or
anti-sprawl initiatives. 3 1 While this is true, the story is more complicated than it appears. The vast majority of the initiatives lumped into
the anti-sprawl category did not propose regulatory limits on new development. Most of them employed far less coercive means to alleviate the negative consequences of sprawl. Publicly funded
conservation efforts, for example, proved extremely popular. Indeed,
voters approved nearly eighty percent of the 257 ballot measures proposing the preservation of open space or the creation of new parks,
including two statewide proposals.'3 2 Voter approval of such measures, however, says little about voter willingness to support growth
controls.
True, voters approved a number of ballot proposals limiting new
development as well.' 3 3 While statewide controls in Colorado and Arizona went down in flames, voters approved a majority of local growth
control proposals. 3 4 Still, growth control proponents have reason to
be concerned. Both Colorado Amendment 24 and Arizona Proposition 202 proposed versions of the academics' "ideal" growth control
scheme. Each proposed statewide growth management plans that
would have concentrated new development in existing population
centers. Both Amendment 24 and Proposition 202 also would have
curbed local government control over land use planning, thereby
minimizing opportunities for individual municipalities to exacerbate
sprawl by inviting developers to set their sights on exurban green
spaces. 135
The local controls that won at the ballot box, however, do not
advance these same goals and may unintentionally have the opposite
131
See PHYLius MYERs & ROBERT PUENTES, GROWTH AT THE BALLOT Box: ELECTING THE
SHAPE OF COMMUNrIIES IN NOVEMBER 2000, at 3-4 (Ctr. on Urban & Metro. Policy, Brook-

ings Inst., Discussion Paper, 2001) (analyzing the 553 state and local "growth-related" ballot measures considered on Election Day 2000), available at http://www.brook.edu/es/
urban/ballotbox/finalreport.pdf.
132
Id at 21-23 (finding that voters approved 201 of the 257 proposals to preserve
open space or build and maintain parks, including 2 of 6 statewide proposals); id. app. at
50 tbl.1 (listing all 553 growth-related ballot measures and election outcome); see also LAND
TRUST ALLANCE, VoTERs INvEsT IN OPEN SPACE: 2000 REFERENDA RESULTS, at http://
www.lta.org/publicpolicy/referenda2000.htm (listing election results on conservation-related initiatives).
133
See MYERs & PUENTES, supra note 131, at 14-16 (analyzing results of "growth management/regulation" proposals).
134
See id. at 14; see alsoMike Anton & Seema Mehta, Electorate Taking Control of Growth,
L.A. TiMrEs, Nov. 12, 2000, at A46 (discussing election results of growth-related ballot measures in California). As MYERs & PUENTES, supra note 131, at 15, indicates, nearly half of
the true growth-control measures were on ballots in California.
135
See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
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effect. First, because local controls cover only one small geographic
area, they do not direct the course of regional growth. 136 Instead,
they tend simply to stop development in its tracks and exclude newcomers through policies such as development moratoria. 137 When
viewed in this light, the types of controls approved by voters on Election Day 2000 begin to look like another familiar, but far more disfa38
vored, land use mechanism-exclusionary zoning.
Second, because local controls cover only one jurisdiction, local
curbs may actually encourage sprawl by forcing developers to set their
sights on green spaces farther and farther from the urban core, where
regulatory sentiment remains favorable.13 9 Thus, local growth controls may only renew the vicious cycle discussed above: exclusionary
land use laws in the inner suburbs push development farther and farther out, thereby exacerbating, rather than controlling, sprawl.
IV
ELECTION 2000 AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

What does this electoral pattern say about the prospects for the
comprehensive, crossjurisdictional growth controls preferred by academics and planners and defeated in Colorado and Arizona? The answer to that question may turn on the explanation behind another:
Why would an electorate that expresses overwhelming concern about
sprawl vote to raise taxes to conserve open space and to impose local
growth controls, but reject proposals designed to address suburban
sprawl through comprehensive, regional growth management?
There are at least three plausible answers to this puzzle. First, not
all of the members of the coalitions that formed to defeat Amendment 24 and Proposition 202 had the same interests at stake in the
136

See William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Cri-

tique, 35 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 509, 526 (2000) (arguing that sprawl is "at least a regional
phenomenon in most states"); Freilich & Davis, supra note 22, at 35-37 (advocating regional or statewide growth controls); Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 20, at 195 ("The only
proven method of controlling the negative effects of sprawl is through a regional growth
management system .... ").
137
See FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 55.
138 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 17, at 979 (raising question of comparison between exclusionary zoning and growth controls); see also E~ic DAMIAN KELLY, MANAGING
GROWTH 216-17 (1993) (arguing that the only possible justification for local
growth controls are the "self-serving rationalizations of the communities adopting them"
and that such controls have disproportionate impact on the poor). Early efforts to limit
new growth were in fact challenged as illegal exclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Constr. Indus.
Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding local land restriction);
Golden v. Planning Board, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972) (upholding Ramapo town zoning
ordinance). Not surprisingly, these challenges met with little success. As William Fischel
has noted, "[g] rowth controls are seemingly beyond judicial reproach on exclusionary
grounds because they democratically exclude everyone." FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 54.
139 FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 37-38; KELLY, supra note 138, at 216.
COMMUNIT
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outcome of initiatives proposing conservation measures or local
growth controls. For example, while developers, who represented the
primary financiers of the "NO" campaigns, might not have believed
they had as much at stake with respect to local growth control measures, they may have believed they could have channeled their new
developments elsewhere. Thus, they may have lacked the incentive to
140
work as hard to defeat local measures.
Second, enlarging the geographic scope of the regulatory proposal may change how voters evaluate the costs and benefits of growth
controls. Building upon the prediction that growth controls drive up
housing prices, a number of academics have suggested that growth
controls benefit existing homeowners and hurt prospective homeowners. Existing homeowners can charge prospective homeowners the
premium that they gain when the government limits new development.14 1 Of course, an existing homeowner who wishes to reap the
benefit of this premium is usually also a prospective homeowner; she
generally plans to sell her home and purchase a new one. In order for
the existing homeowner to reap the full benefit of the premium,
therefore, she must be able to sell her home within the controlled
area and move to a home outside of it, where she will not have to pay
a similar growth control imposed premium. Regional or statewide
growth controls make it much more difficult to profit from the growth
control premium. If an existing homeowner must leave the state in
order to avoid paying the growth control premium on a new home,
her costs of exit are much higher than if she can move one town over.
She might have to change jobs, leave family and friends, and make
other lifestyle changes. Thus, increasing the scope of the proposed
controls may lead more residents to vote as prospective homeowners,
who worry about the price effects of growth controls, instead of as
existing homeowners, who stand to benefit from increases in property
values.
Finally, the American psyche may also explain these results. Kenneth Jackson's insightful history of suburbia illustrates that a detached, suburban home has long formed the centerpiece of the
American Dream. 142 Contemporary public opinion polls illustrate
that this remains the case. Americans consider a single-family suburban home their "ideal," and they are willing to make significant financial sacrifices, and commute long distances, to live in one. 143 In
140
See generally, Buzbee, supra note 16, at 373-78 (describing the "powerful motives
and incentives in both the political and market spheres" of the sprawl debate).
141 See Ellickson, supra note 50, at 400 (connecting support for growth controls with
home ownership); see also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
142 JACKSON, supra note 19, at 287-90.
143 See, e.g., ANTHoNY DowNs, STUCK IN TRAFFIc 16-17 (1992); see also Vicki Been, Comment on ProfessorJeny Frug'sThe Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1109, 1110-11
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Colorado and Arizona, opponents successfully appealed to our psychological fixation on home ownership. When they told voters that
comprehensive growth controls might place this cornerstone of the
American Dream out of reach, voters responded by overwhelmingly
rejecting the controls.'"
Jackson and others have noted that the popularity of the suburban lifestyle arises out of the illusion of country life. 145 Not only have
American patterns of development always been relatively disperse by
international standards, 46 but for over one hundred and fifty years,
Americans have viewed a suburban home as a retreat from the bustle
and congestion of the city, an escape to a semipastoral setting.1 47 This
ideal, however illusory, may also have played a role in voters' rejection
of comprehensive growth controls in Colorado and Arizona. After all,
proponents of these measures designed them to increase the density of
residential development by concentrating development within urban
growth boundaries. The American opposition to density, which might
lead voters to reject the "urban growth boundary" model of growth
controls, also explains support for local growth control measures. After all, these local growth control measures curb or halt all new development within a jurisdiction, and therefore preserve any remaining
open space within municipal boundaries. It also explains why publicly
financed conservation efforts proved popular during the last election
cycle. Preserving green spaces not only enhances the livability and
"pastoral feel" of existing suburbs, but it also tends to increase prop148
erty values.
For all of these reasons, last November's election results suggest
that the odds are stacked against comprehensive growth management
accomplished through a statewide plebiscite. Not only do growth con(1996) (discussing economic reasons that Americans prefer the suburbs); Burchell & Shad,
supra note 17, at 138 ("Sprawl is so well-accepted by the public that the AAA-rated locations
for both residential and nonresidential development are increasingly farther out rather
than closer in, and more, rather than less, segregated by type of land use."); Buzbee, supra
note 21, at 65-66 ("Many Americans recently surveyed about sprawl, however, confirmed
market trends that indicate many, if not most, citizens favor new residential developments

with cul de sacs set at a substantial distance from retail markets and mass transit."); Peter
Gordon & Harry W. Richardson, Are Compact Cities a Desirable Planning Goal?, 63 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS'N 95, 96-97 (1997) (discussing strong preferences for suburban living).
144
See supra notes 68-70, 74, 83-84 and accompanying text.
145 JACKSON, supra note 19, at 73. See generally ROBERT FiSHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS:

THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA (1987) (tracing the history and development of the modern suburb).
146
See WITOLD RYBczYNsKI, CrIY LIFE 77-83 (1995).
147
SeeJACKSON, supra note 19, at 71-72 (arguing that the suburban home offered retreat from commercialism and industry and "seemed immune to the dislocations of an
industrializing society and cut off from the toil and turbulence of emerging immigrant
ghettoes").
148
See Buzbee, supra note 16, at 384 (noting connection between proximity to substantial park space and property values).
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trol opponents have voter inertia on their side, 149 they also proved
twice during the last election cycle that they could convince even
avowed opponents of suburban sprawl to vote against statewide plans
to curb it. Given the extremely high stakes at issue, 150 it is not unreasonable to expect similar, and similarly potent, coalitions to emerge
when proposals similar to the defeated Colorado and Arizona initiatives arise in the future.
Growth control proponents have vowed to renew their fight for
comprehensive growth management in the state legislatures. 15 ' And,
at least for now, hopes are high in Colorado, where opponents have
agreed to cooperate and work toward growth control legislation and
the legislature seems poised to act. 15 2 Perhaps these renewed efforts
will enjoy some measure of success. The threat of an initiative has
prompted legislative action in the past. 5 3 And even unsuccessful initiatives play an important role, as Professor Briffault has argued, "alerting legislators that public concern on a subject that the legislature
has neglected has become great enough to get a measure on the ballot, yet giving the legislature a grace period in which to move on the
matter before the voters become sufficiently aroused to do it for
them."154 The probability that the legislature will respond to such signals may be particularly high when, as in Colorado and Arizona, initial
public support for the policies proposed was high.' 5 5
Still, it is important to remember that the defeated growth control initiatives were "born of disappointment" 156 in the legislative proSee supra note 127 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
151 See Ames & Hartman, supra note 68; Kathleen Ingley, New Growth Plans Promised
Despite Defeat of 2 Measures, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 9, 2000, at A22 (stating environmentalists
are planning a new ballot proposition to regulate development on state land); Tom Kenworthy, Colo. Growth Limit Defeated but Not Dead, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2001, at 4A (quoting
Arizona Sierra Club member as saying the growth issue has not gone away); Blake Morlock,
Group Already PlansLand Issue Vote for '02, TucsoN CITzEN, Nov. 20, 2000, at 1A.
152
See Erika Gonzalez, Business Likes 'Status Quo' Vote, DENVER RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWs,
Nov. 9, 2000, at 1B; John Sanko, Owens Mounts Mission Against Sprawl, DENVER RocKY
MOUNTAIN NEvs, Nov. 16, 2000, at 4A In contrast, the Arizona legislature shows no interest of tackling the issue. See Kenworthy, supra note 151 (noting "marked contrast" between
determination to enact legislation in Colorado and the lack of interest in Arizona); Blake
Morlock, After Loss, Eco-Groups Seek Smaller Victories, TUCSON CITIZEN, Nov. 20, 2000, at IA.
153
Briffault, supra note 112, at 1372 ("[T]he existence of the initiative process as a
supplement to the legislature will influence the pattern of legislative behavior in the direction of greater conformity to popular interests."); see Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of PopularInitiatives, 40 Am. J. POL. SCI. 99 (1996).
154
Briffault, supranote 112, at 1372.
155 See Gerber, supra note 153, at 121 (finding that the probability that a legislature
would adopt a law in response to threat of initiative increased with the level of voter
support).
156
Gillette, supra note 113, at 976.
149
150
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cess, as most initiatives are. 15 7 This disappointment resulted not from

legislators' neglect of growth issues. To the contrary, legislators in
both states considered, and repeatedly rejected, growth control legislation. 158 If accounts in the popular press are accurate, their rejection
was at least partly a response to strong objections from the very special
interests that organized to defeat Amendment 24 and Proposition
202.159
There is every reason to believe that these interests will continue
to oppose the radical overhaul of traditional land use regulation advocated by growth control proponents. The stakes are too high to demur.160 Realtors and developers worry that the controls would
increase the price of housing and dry up sales. While these increased

costs usually pass to home purchasers, at some point, home purchasers may become unable or unwilling to accept them. When this happens, they may choose instead to defer home purchases, spending
resources to refurbish their existing homes.' 61 Similar concerns motivate low-income housing advocates such as Habitat for Humanity, who
worry that increasing the cost of new housing might slow the "filtering" process that provides most low-income housing opportunities in
this country. 1 62 Unions also worry that growth controls may slow the
pace of new development, thus leading to a drop in the number of
65
jobs available for members.'

157
See id. at 982 (citing "[a]necdotal evidence" that "special interest groups initiate
plebiscites only after failure to convince the legislature to enact similar provisions"); Lowenstein, supra note 115, at 567-68 (implying that policies proposed through the initiative
process have, as a matter of course, suffered rejection at the hands of the legislature).
158
See Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth at Century's End: The State of the States, 31 UP..
LAw. 601, 606-07 (1999) (discussing Arizona legislature's failed efforts to regulate sprawl).
159 See, e.g., Paula Moore, Growth Initiative Killed, DENVER Bus. J., Apr. 7, 2000, at 6A
(attributing the defeat of Colorado growth control initiative to lobbying by home builders
and the rural electric cooperative).
160
See Buzbee, supra note 16, at 373-78 (describing interests involved in sprawl
debate).
161
See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary"Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REy. 1167,
1186 (1981) (explaining how increase in housing costs due to land use regulation may lead
to deferred housing purchases).
162
As Kenneth Jackson observes:
The positive result of this [suburbanization] process is called "filtering."
The construction of new housing in the suburbs puts competitive pressure

on the older housing stock, depressing its price ....

Thus, the typical

model of urban growth in the United States has been the sequential reuse
of housing by progressively lower-income households. Were it not for the
subdivisions of the periphery, the shelter available to the poor would be
even more limited and expensive.
JACKSON, supra note 19, at 285; see alsoEllickson, supra note 161, at 1184-87 (describing the
filtering process).
163
See Morson, supra note 61.
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Finally, local governments proved to be vociferous opponents of
the Colorado and Arizona measures, 6 4 which would have severely limited their authority to regulate land use. 165 Local government officials
have good reason to fear comprehensive reforms that limit this authority. 166 Given the fact that local governments have no inherent
power,1 67 it is understandable that local officials would fight to pre68
serve the most significant power entrusted to them by state law.'
Furthermore, as Professor Charles Tiebout predicted, decentralized
local governments compete for residents by providing an attractive
package of services at the lowest possible cost. 169 Professor Been,
among others, has demonstrated how local communities employ land
use laws to achieve this objective.' 7 0 By depriving them of this tool,
the Colorado and Arizona amendments would have limited local governments' abilities to stem the "exit" of desirable residents by shaping
7
their communities to fit local tastes.' '
The reality is that these efforts to influence the legislative process
may prove successful. Public choice literature suggests that special interests exert significant influence in the legislative process, 7 2 and that
"decisions made by legislators may be far more susceptible to interest
group pressure than plebiscitary ones."' 73 For all its warts, perhaps
164 O'Brien, supra note 54 (complaining that "the mayors, city council members and
county commissioners... have fought tooth and nail to repel all intruders from their petty
flefdoms").
165
Colorado's Amendment 24 would have limited local autonomy by requiring local
governments to submit all changes in growth boundaries to voters, see LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
OF THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra note 55, Amend. 24 § 5, at 55; Arizona's Proposition
202 would have similarly tied local officials' hands by pegging the pace of new development to population growth, see SEC'Y OF STATE, STATE OF Aiuz., supra note 75, Prop. 202
§ 11-1602(A)(1), at 109.
166
See Buzbee, supra note 16, at 374 (discussing local government motivations for opposing growth controls).
167
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv.L. REv. 1057, 1062-63 (1980).
168
See Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 1), 90 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1990) ("Land
use control is the most important local regulatory power.").
169
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
(1956).
170
See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 506-28 (1991); see also WILLIAM A. FisCHEL, THE ECONOMICs OF ZONING LA.ws 214-20 (1985) (analyzing the local government

structure in the twenty-five largest U.S. cities).
171
See Briffault, supra note 32, at 352 (1990) ("Moreover, for many suburbs, particularly the more affluent ones, the principal local regulatory goals often are controlling
growth and preserving the status quo. Local legal autonomy significantly empowers them
in this quest.").
172
See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 113, at 978. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRiCKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 12-21 (1991) (reviewing literature on interest group influence upon political process); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof
Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 883-908 (1987) (providing a comprehensive collection
of political science "rational choice" literature).
173
Gillette, supra note 113, at 981.
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the best argument for the initiative process may be that it provides an
external check on the power of insiders who dominate the legislative
and regulatory processes. 174 Developers, unions, and local governments are all just such insiders-repeat players in the state legislative
process. As such, legislators concerned about re-election, campaign
contributions, and the like have more of an incentive to please these
interests than they do the dispersed electorate.1 75
Another significant benefit of the initiative process is that the initiative's author controls the policy agenda-a fact standing in sharp
contrast to the legislative process.1 76 As Professor William Riker has
noted, the legislative "agenda is set by a combination of the legislature's majority party (or a committee of it), back benchers who in one
way or anther insert themselves in the agenda-setting process, and the
pre-existing legislative rules." 177 As a result, even a successful push for
legislative action on growth issues is far more likely to yield a compromise closer to the desires of these "back benchers," including the
groups who opposed Amendment 24 and Proposition 202, than the
policy desired by growth control proponents.
Indeed, their continued influence was immediately evident in the
months following the defeat of Colorado Amendment 24. After the
election, Colorado Governor Bill Owens warned that he would be
"busting heads if necessary" to achieve legislation addressing
sprawl.1 78 Months later, a legislative statement over competing proposals reamined. The Governor called an additional legislative session on the growth issue, and local pundits predicted that more hardline supporters of regional growth management would be forced to
accept more moderate reform. 179 Members of the anti-Amendment
24 campaign are devoting their excess cash reserves to keeping their
coalition together during the legislative battle ahead. The coalition
also hired a land-use attorney to draft growth control legislation. 180
And, in Arizona, the political disinterest in renewing the growth man174
Briffault, supra note 112, at 1368; see also SCHMIDT, supra note 112, at 25-40 (discussing advantages of initiatives over legislative process); Baker, supra note 117, at 747 (noting
that collective action theory suggests that interest groups can less efficiently and successfully lobby the voting population at large than legislators).
175 See Briffault, supra note 112, at 1367; Gillette, supra note 113, at 978-79. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 38-49 (1982) (discussing the greater collective

action problem faced by larger groups); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
176

53-65 (1965) (same).
Baker, supra note 117, at 732 (noting that this difference has been overlooked in

much of the scholarship comparing the two processes).
177 William H. Riker, Comment on Baker, "DirectDemocracy and Discrimination:A Public
Choice Perspective", 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 791, 791 (1991).
178
See Sanko, supra note 152.
179 See Matsunaka, Owens Spar over Sprawl, DENVER POST,Aug. 29, 2001, at B8.
180

See Michele Ames, Solution to Growth Is Sought: Coalition Attempts to Stick Together,

DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Nov. 30, 2000, at 7A.
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agement debate itself suggests the influence of growth control
opponents.
That is not to say that comprehensive growth management policies are unattainable-experience in Oregon and elsewhere has
proven otherwise. 181 Rather, the results in the last election cycle suggest that the road to reform will be a rough one. 18 2 Growth control
opponents have shown that they can organize to defeat such proposals-either at the ballot box or in the state legislatures. And, voter
approval of Oregon's Measure 7 raises the question of whether the
types of growth controls advocated by academics are politically sustainable over the long haul.
CONCLUSION

Americans say that they worry about sprawl. But, they also say,
overwhelmingly, that they prefer to live in suburban homes with
yards, 8 3 and that they are willing to commute long distances to
18 4
sprawling developments where this "ideal" is an affordable reality.
November election results demonstrate that these are not necessarily
inconsistent sentiments. The votes on growth issues neatly reflect a
classic American sentiment-that the suburbs offer an escape from
the disruptions of the urban core to life in a semipastoral setting.18 5
Thus, in Colorado and Arizona-and perhaps also in Oregon-voters
signaled a limited tolerance for regulations that curb their ability to
"exit" to greener pastures in the land of sprawl (or that threaten to
eliminate the limited greenness of their own neighborhoods by increasing the density of residential development).
Elsewhere, however, voters approved dozens of initiatives that address the ills of sprawl by financing the public acquisition of more
parks and green spaces. 18 6 Voter willingness to approve these "halfstepping" measures may come as cold comfort to the visionaries who
sponsored Colorado's Amendment 24 and Arizona's Proposition 202.
181 See, e.g., NELSON & DUNCAN, supra note 31, at 19-36 (describing state and regional
growth management policies); Buzbee, supranote 136, at 532-35 (describing factors leading to comprehensive growth management in the Atlanta region); supra notes 85-88 and

accompanying text (discussing Oregon law).
182 See Buzbee, supra note 136, at 528-32 (discussing the political, institutional, and
market barriers to comprehensive reform of American land use laws).

183

Buzbee, supra note 21, at 65-66 ("Many Americans recently surveyed about sprawl,

however, confirmed market trends that indicate many, if not most, citizens favor new resi-

dential developments with cul de sacs set at a substantial distance from retail markets and
mass transit.")
184 See DowNs, supra note 25, at 16-17; Been, supra note 143, at 1110-13 (discussing

economic reasons why Americans prefer the suburbs).
185 SeeJACKSON, supra note 19, at 57-60. See also Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 20, at
186 (arguing that "[s]prawl has been promoted by social forces, which reflect the desire for

a rural lifestyle coupled with an urban income").
186 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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While the acquisition of additional open space may not be a magic
wand that will solve all of our urban and suburban woes, these policies
have significant benefits of their own. As Professor Buzbee has recently argued, green spaces not only break the monotony of the
"sprawlscape" and offer significant biodiversity benefits, but they also
can serve a community-building function by acting as public meeting
places that "counteract the insularity and frequent homogeneity associated with new sprawling development."' 18 7 Because proximity to
parks and green spaces tends to increase property values, these policies may also entice developers to consider building more densely
near them. 8 8 If academic predictions about the negative consequences of local growth controls are correct, pro-conservation policies
may prove to be more beneficial than other politically feasible antisprawl policies.

187

Buzbee, supra note 16, at 384.

188

Id.

